1 Introduction.
There has been some concern with the lack of growth, particularly of employment growth, in Indian manufacturing, and its relationship to various institutional constraints. Partly this is a result of the fact that the Indian manufacturing sector is much smaller than that sector in other economies of similar size. Table 1 illustrates this fact. It indicates that the manufacturing share of value added in India is smaller than that share in other large developing economies, though it is similar to that share in smaller countries with GDP per capita similar to that of India (Pakistan and Vietnam). However as Table 2 shows, the growth rate of value added in manufacturing in India is noticeably lower than that in these smaller similar income countries. Indeed the sectoral growth rate comparisons in Table 2 are rather striking. The growth rate of value added in services in India is comparable to that in China, and about 10 percentage points higher than that in any other country in our list. In rather stark contrast the growth rate of value added in manufacturing in India is only about a half that in China and Vietnam, and quite a bit lower than that in Pakistan.
Why is the relative performance of the Indian manufacturing sector, relative both to the In particular we analyze the labor and capital employment rates of Indian manufacturing firms and their relationship to productivity and various institutional constraints.
Several researchers have argued that the restrictiveness of labor market regulations in
India is one of the most important constraints on the performance of its manufacturing sector. Our analysis focuses exclusively on the formal (organized) manufacturing sector in India for which data is available and to which labor market regulations are applicable. Labor market regulations are described in detail in Ahsan and Pages (2005) and in World Bank (2006) . Here we only point out the most controversial of those regulations: the 1982 amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 which made the firing of workers illegal for firms employing more than 100 workers except with previous permission from the appropriate state government.
The evidence indicates that the permission to fire workers is rarely granted (see Ahsan and Pages, 2005) . Early work by Fallon and Lucas (1991) found that the introduction of employment laws restricting the firing of workers in India led to a substantial decline in the demand for labor by manufacturing industries. Hence, the objective of the regulations -to protect jobs -resulted in fewer jobs being created. More recently, Besley and Burgess (2004) find that Indian states which amended labor market regulations to make them more restrictive (i.e., to give greater protection to workers) experience lower output, lower employment, lower investment, and lower productivity in the manufacturing sector. Ahsan and Pages (2005) also find important employment losses in Indian manufacturing as a result of restrictive regulations on the firing of workers, particularly in labor-intensive industries such as textiles.
In this chapter we ask whether factor employment in manufacturing firms in India is "abnormally" low or "abnormally" high conditional on: (i) firm productivity, (ii) the amount of other factors employed by firms, and (iii) the factor costs faced by firms. With respect to labor our measure of "abnormal" is constructed as the ratio of (1) the labor employment that would be optimal for the firm if there were no hiring and firing costs (or constraints), and (2) the firm's actual employment of labor. That is, if our measure, which we will call "underutilization of labor", for a firm equals x then a firm without hiring and firing costs that had the same productivity, capital and factor costs as the given firm would increase its demand for labor relative to the given firm by a factor of x. on the implications of the empirical magnitudes obtained we also compute the percentage difference between the actual cost of labor and the cost of labor that would make a firm without hiring and firing costs just satisfied with its current labor employment.
We then look at differences in our underutilization of labor measure across Indian states, and at the relationship between our underutilization of labor measures and measures of productivity, underutilization of capital (described below), and data on institutional constraints to doing business collected by the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys. We find very large differences in the extent of underutilization of labor across Indian states. Although it is probably impossible to eliminate all the employment constraints faced by Indian manufacturing firms, we might think it is possible that the states with "poorly functioning"
labor markets, that is states with large underutilization of labor, could, with institutional improvements, approach the figures for underutilization of labor in those states with better functioning markets. We delve deeper into the meaning of the expression "poorly functioning" in the last part of the chapter where we summarize the relationship between our underutilization figures and other characteristics of the firm and the states it operates in.
We want to be clear at the outset that our underutilization figures should not be taken as literal predictions of what would happen to the manufacturing demand for labor were policy-makers to eliminate all hiring and firing costs in a given state. This because were policy-makers to eliminate these costs and constraints for all firms in a state and the firms began to respond by employing more labor, the cost of labor would likely rise, and the output price would likely fall below what our current estimates predict (the current estimates do not account for the impact of an increase of a firm's competitors quantities on the firm's own sales). These two processes would decrease the firm's marginal revenue product for labor and hence their incentive to hire more workers. This chapter also considers an analogous measure of "underutilization" of capital. This measure is constructed as the ratio of: (1) the optimal capital for the firm if there were perfect rental markets for capital goods, and (2) the firm's actual capital stock. The perfect rental markets concept is quite abstract; it assumes that firms could rent each different kind of capital good at an annual rental cost equal to the sum of the current rate of interest on loans to manufacturing firms plus the depreciation rate on those capital goods. Still our results on capital are both comforting in that they correspond to our intuitions on the capital market, and surprising in how different they are from our labor underutilization patterns.
In particular there is evidence that capital markets are much better at arbitraging differences across states than labor markets. First, the differences in both the cost of capital and the underutilization of capital across states are noticeably smaller than the differences in both labor costs and the underutilization of labor across states and the magnitudes are striking. The interstate variance in the percentage underutilization of labor is about three and a half times the interstate variance in the percentage underutilization of capital. Second, though we obtain large positive numbers for the underutilization of labor, that is labor is "underutilized" compared to what would happen if there were no hiring and firing costs or constraints, the numbers for the underutilization of capital are negative. That is, given the amount of labor employed by firms, firm productivity, and cost of capital, firms are employing more capital than they would employ if they were facing perfect rental markets for capital goods.
Of course the overutilization of capital may just be a response to the fact that firms are underutilizing labor. That is, firms which face many constraints in the hiring and firing of workers may respond by increasing their use of capital relative to labor. Indeed, as we show below, firms which underutilize labor disproportionately tend to overutilize capital disproportionately. Moreover it is clear that if labor employment were to rise, say in response to an improvement in labor market institutions, the marginal revenue product of the capital in place would rise, and our measure of the overutilization of capital would fall. Moreover the overutilization of capital figures that we obtain are much smaller in magnitude than the underutilization of labor figures. Consequently, improvements in labor market regulations that may be feasible may well also eliminate the overutilization of capital. Unfortunately to answer whether this is likely to be true we would require a more detailed general equilibrium model alluded to above.
The last section of this chapter investigates the reduced form relationships (i) among our measures of underutilization of labor, underutilization of capital, and productivity, and
(ii) between these three measures and answers to questions posed on the investment climate survey. Perhaps the most striking finding of this analysis is that the extent of underutilization of labor by a firm is strongly and positively related to the firm's productivity. The more productive firms also tend to overutilize capital somewhat more than the average, though not to the same extent that they underutilize labor. The results in prior sections indicated that liberalizing the labor market in states where there is high underutilization of labor is likely to result in significant increases in both labor demand and wages in those states. The results in the last section give us reason to believe that a lowering of labor market constraints would also increase productivity, and it would do so without significant increases in the demand for capital. We should expect an increase in productivity both because the more productive firms are likely to increase their output disproportionately, and because each firm's productivity should increase as labor and capital employment move towards their efficient levels.
Other relevant reduced form findings include the following: (i) firms which suffer more production losses due to electricity outages are less productive than the average firm in their states, and firms in states in which the average production losses due to outages are high underutilize labor and capital more than firms in states with less frequent outages, (ii) firms reporting more problems with corruption are the more productive firms in the state and they have relatively high underutilization of both factors of production, (ii) within states, it is the relatively more productive firms that are more likely to receive loans, suggesting that the loan-granting institutions are able to select out the more productive firms, and (iv)
states in which a disproportionate number of firms received loans are the states with less underutilization of both factors of production, particularly of capital.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 describes the computation of the underutilization measures. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the underutilization of labor and capital, respectively. Section 6 analyzes productivity. Section 7 discusses the relationships between underutilization of labor and capital, productivity, and investment climate variables. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data.
Our analysis requires the use of data on factors of production and sales for manufacturing firms in India. • estimates of a production function, or more precisely of a "sales generating" function,
• estimates of the cost of employing labor (capital).
The availability of a sales generating function enables the calculation of the increment in sales for a unit increase of employment at different employment levels for each firm. The labor that the firm would employ if there were no hiring and firing costs or constraints is obtained as the labor employment level that would set the firm's increment in sales due to a new worker exactly equal to the cost of employing that worker. An increment in labor employment above this "statically optimal" level would generate more labor costs than sales, and a labor employment level below this static optimum would mean that the firm would increase sales more than costs if it increased its number of workers. Our estimates of underutilization of capital are obtained analogously based on the cost of capital.
Sales Generating Functions.
The term "sales generating" function was introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) to emphasize that the fact that they were analyzing the relationship between sales (deflated by a producer price index) and the inputs that went into producing those sales, rather than the relationship between physical quantities of outputs and inputs as in a production function. When working with sales data from homogenous product industries, we can insure that we are analyzing the determinants of the physical quantity of output by allowing for industry specific multiplicative constant terms, which account for inter-industry price differences. Though in our analysis we allow for a separate multiplicative constant for the 7 different industries, the homogenous product paradigm is a stretch for our data. In fact, the dependent variable used in our analysis is the sales generated by a firm operating in a differentiated product industry.
This leaves us with the question of whether the relationship that we are estimating has a natural interpretation, and if that interpretation has consequences for the choice of estimation procedure or for subsequent use of the estimates. We will assume that each firm's demand curve has a constant elasticity conditional on the output (or prices) of the other firms, and that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. Then there is a log-log relationship between sales and inputs, just as there is a log-log relationship between output and inputs in the Cobb-Douglas production function case, but now the objects in that log-log relationship have a slightly different interpretation. Differences in productivity in generating sales will reflect the sum of differences in the location of demand curves and differences in the ability to transform inputs into physical output. The input coefficients estimated from the sales generating function will reflect the physical production function coefficients divided by one minus the inverse elasticity of demand. As a result, (i) whenever we consider counterfactuals which change the output of competing firms, we should expect each firm's "sales productivity" to change, and (ii) we should be careful not to interpret our estimates of returns to scale as scale effects in the production of physical output.
We will use our sales generating function estimates in two ways: (1) to construct the distribution of firm productivity in producing sales, and (2) to measure the excess demand (supply) for labor and/or capital at the going wage (rental) rate. The measure of firm productivity is sales divided by an index of inputs. We need the sales generating function estimates to obtain the weights used to construct the index of inputs. Our measure of excess demand (supply) is the number of units of labor (capital) that a firm would have to hire before the marginal revenue product of labor (capital) would equal the going wage (rental) rate. The marginal revenue product schedule is the derivative of the sales generating function with respect to the input, and hence also requires estimates of the sales generating function.
Subsequent sections of the paper address the substantive implications of our productivity and excess demand measures.
The correct way to obtain sales generating function estimates depends on the appropriate model for input demand and for firm exit. This because the residual in the sales equation is productivity, and firms' input and exit decisions will depend on their productivity. As a result both an endogeneity and a selection issue must be accounted for before one can obtain reliable estimates. The endogeneity issue is that the residual in the equation of interest is correlated with the variables (the inputs) on the right hand side of that equation. The selection issue is that small firms (firms with a low capital stock or other sunk investments)
continue (do not exit) only if their productivity is quite large, while large firms will continue even with lower productivity. As a result, the distribution of productivity of the firms that survive, and hence are included in the data on transitions in productivity, is not independent of the quantity of capital.
The next subsection describes our estimation procedure. The reader who is not interested in the technical details of how the estimates are obtained should be able to skip this section and still understand the remainder of the paper.
Estimation Procedure.
We now describe how we obtained the sales generating function estimates. The basic framework for estimation is taken from Olley and Pakes (1996) , but we modified their estimation techniques to account for special features of the institutional setting in Indian manufacturing, as explained below.
) be value added (sales minus material inputs), labor, capital, investment, and temporary labor for firm j in year t. All of these variables, except investment, are in logs. Temporary labor is defined as all (paid) short-term (i.e., for less than a year) employees with no guarantee of renewal of employment contract, while permanent labor is defined as all paid workers that are not temporary. Our sales generating function is given by:
where we have written the disturbance as a sum of ω j , t and η
is defined to be the productivity that the firm expects for the period given its information at the time when investment decisions are made (which we take to be the beginning of the period). η j , t is defined to be the difference between the actual realization of the productivity term and the
firm's expectation. If there is measurement error in sales it will also be included in η
Our goal is to obtain estimates of the coefficients (β
The problem is that due to the selection and endogeneity problems, standard estimators for those coefficients -including OLS, fixed effects, and instrumental variables -will produce inconsistent estimates of these parameters. In particular, (i) the distribution of the ω j , t which we observe has been truncated by an exit decision whose truncation point depends on the right-hand side variables, and (ii) since the productivities in the truncated distribution are known to the firm at the beginning of the period and correlated over time, any reasonable model for input choice will result in those productivities being correlated with the firm's labor and capital inputs.
Since ω j , t is defined to be the expected productivity at the time when the investment decision is made, Olley and Pakes (1996) show that the investment function (i
written as a function of ω j , t and other "dynamic factors". Dynamic factors are the factors of production which the firm finds costly to adjust over the period between investment decisions, so that past levels of one of those factors affect the current employment of that factor independently of current cost and demand conditions. In Industrial Organization terminology, dynamic factors are "state" variables in the dynamic problem that leads to the firm's investment choices. Olley and Pakes assume that labor is not a dynamic factor (i.e., labor can be adjusted optimally in every period). However, given the structure of the labor laws in India, we shall also try specifications where labor is considered a dynamic factor.
Since we try different specifications where the set of factors which are dynamic varies, we change our notation slightly here and let x d denote the list of dynamic factors and x s be a list of the static factors (i.e., those factors of production which can be adjusted optimally in every period).
Our investment function then becomes:
industry varies over time. Provided that i j , t > 0, this function has an inverse which is given by:
Substituting equation (1) into the sales generating function, using the new notation for the inputs, and rearranging we have:
where
,
) are the coefficients of the static and dynamic inputs, respectively.
) cannot respond to movements in η
, that is if those factors of production cannot respond to changes in productivity that occur between the time when investment is made and the time when production occurs, then equation (??) can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) using a polynomial (or any other sufficiently rich non-parametric function) to approximate φ(i 
).
So the probability of survival conditional on information available at time t is given by:
where F (·) is a distribution function. Note that, for any given ω, the function F (·) is monotone decreasing in ω(·), so for fixed ω we can invert this equation and write:
We will use this fact below.
From equation (1), ω
). Substituting this into equation (3) shows that our survival equation can be estimated as:
, we have:
We can now return to the issue of estimating β . Consider period t + 1. We only observe
if the firm survives and our expectation for ω
conditional on survival is given by:
, where the first equality uses equations (1) and (4), the last equation definesg(·), and Consequently,
This equation can be consistently estimated by substituting our consistent estimates of of those variables must be used in forming the moments to be used in the estimation.
Estimation Results.
The sales generating function estimates we report combine survey data for Indian manufacturing firms in all 7 industries (listed in Appendix A) but allow for industry specific average levels of (the log of) productivity. While we attempted to estimate a sales generating function for each industry separately, the data was not rich enough to determine industry differences in input coefficients in a reliable way. Table 3 presents a selection of our results in two panels.
Panel A does not allow the sales generating function coefficients to differ by firm size, while Panel B allows small firms, defined as those with less than 50 employees, to have different coefficients relative to large firms. Since we will investigate later in the paper differences in productivity by firm size, we wanted to ensure that any differences we find then were not simply a result of firms below a certain size cutoff being engaged in activities that were different enough to warrant different sales generating function coefficients. The estimation of different coefficients across firm size also accommodates a special feature of the Indian manufacturing sector which is its inclusion of a much larger share of relatively small firms than the manufacturing sectors in other economies. This is illustrated in Figure 1 which compares the size distribution of firms in India to that in China, Brazil, and Indonesia, based on data from Investment Climate Surveys. When examining whether there were differences in sales generating function coefficients by firm size, we found that the largest differences occurred for the 50 employee cutoff reported in Table 3 .
We will focus on the estimates that allow for different coefficients across small and large firms (Panel B) as Table 3 provides some evidence that such differences exist, particularly in the labor and temporary labor coefficients. Columns 1 and 2 show the OLS estimates for the full sample and for the subsample of observations for which investment differs from zero, respectively. As discussed in the previous subsection, to obtain our sales generating function estimates we can only use observations with positive investment, as it is only then that the investment can be used to help control for prior values of productivity which must be controlled for in order to get unbiased estimates of the coefficients of interest.
Columns 3 and 4 show the standard Olley and Pakes estimators. Column 3 shows estimates that control only for the endogeneity of input choices, while the estimates in column 4 control also for the selection bias induced by exit. In moving from Column 2 to column 3, we are controlling for the fact that the capital and labor inputs are likely to be positively correlated with the residual (which, recall, includes productivity). Thus, we expect to see a fall in input coefficients, which we do, and a fall in the estimate of "returns to scale", in this case one which is reasonably dramatic. As explained earlier, the fact that larger firms will continue in operation with lower values of productivity than smaller firms induces a negative correlation between capital and the residual in the estimates in column 3. Therefore, when we move from column 3 to column 4 we expect to see an increase in the capital coefficients, which again is reasonably dramatic. These results are similar to those found in Olley and Pakes (1996) .
Columns 5 and 6 differ from prior results, including those in columns 3 and 4, by allowing labor to not be fully adjustable in the short run. These specifications accommodate a special feature of the Indian manufacturing sector which are the stringent labor market regulations it faces. Thus, hiring and firing costs for labor cannot be taken to be negligible as in the earlier production function estimation literature which assumed that labor can be optimized in the short-run. If labor is partially fixed, then the results in columns 3 and 4 combine the impact of the quantity of labor in place on investment for a given capital stock -an effect that we would expect to be positive -with the effect of labor on output conditional on capital (with the sales generating function coefficient of interest). Accordingly, we would expect the labor coefficient estimates in columns 5 and 6 to be smaller than those in columns 3 and 4. Again we get quite a striking effect providing evidence that in Indian manufacturing we should think of labor as not being freely adjustable in the short run. Note also that allowing labor to be partially fixed brings down the estimates of the "returns to scale" noticeably.
We note that none of these estimates allow either temporary or permanent labor to adjust to the shocks in productivity that occur during the period. We did some investigation of this possibility, but the specifications in columns 5 and 6 seem to be as rich a specification as our data can support. That is, further refinements resulted in large increases in standard errors, and no significant differences in coefficients from those reported above.
3.2 Factor Costs: Labor.
We begin by discussing labor costs. The immobility of labor across states could enable interstate differences in labor costs to develop. Also, our analysis treats permanent labor as a homogenous product. Unfortunately, information on schooling that would allow us to differentiate workers in our analysis was not consistently available. As a result our underutilization of labor estimates should probably be interpreted as underutilization of labor for the same mix of workers as the firms are currently employing. However if some types of workers contribute more to the firm's output than others, and there are systematically different fractions of different types of workers in different industries, then this would imply that we should allow for different costs of labor in different industries.
To determine whether we should allow the costs of labor to vary by industry or by state we estimated a regression of average wages from our survey on industry and state dummies.
The industry dummies were neither jointly nor individually significant, whereas many of the state dummies were significant. Consequently, we allowed for differences in labor costs across states but not across industries. Table 3 provides the state level average wages from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) using the most inclusive definition of wage in that survey, and compares them to the average wages in our survey. We use the ASI wages in what follows since the ASI sample is more representative than our sample, and because for the vast majority of states ASI wages are higher than the average wages from our survey. Hence, by using the ASI wages we will, if anything, underestimate the extent of labor underutilization.
3.3 Factor Costs: Capital. Table 4 shows the state level averages of our measures of the components of the cost of capital. The Indian ASI contains measures of average interest rates on loans and average depreciation rates of capital. Our cost of capital measure is the sum of these two averages.
Our surveys provide a measure of the interest rate on loans. The mean and median of this measure for each state are shown in the last two columns of the table, and they are quite similar to the interest rates from the Indian ASI.
Note that there is much less variance in the cost of capital across states than there is in the cost of labor. The coefficient of variation of the cost of capital across states is only half that of wages (15 and 14% in 2001 and 2004, versus 28 and 30%, respectively) . We also regressed the average interest rate of loans from our survey on industry and state dummies.
The industry nor the state dummies were neither jointly nor individually significant. Recall that the state dummies were significant in the wage regression. This difference suggests that capital markets in India are able to arbitrage interstate differences in the returns to capital reasonably effectively while labor markets and labor flows are much less able to arbitrage interstate differences in the returns to labor. Still for consistency with the labor results we use the cost of capital from the ASI and allow it to vary across states in the calculations that follow.
4 Underutilization of Labor.
The most striking result that we obtain is the extent of underutilization of labor across manufacturing firms in India. Overall we estimate underutilization of 5.8 times current manufacturing employment in 2001, and 3.4 times in 2004. Further underutilization is estimated to be large and positive for every size group of firms (see Figure 2 ) and every state (see Table 5 ) in India. Uttar Pradesh has the lowest GDP per capita and the second lowest growth rate in GDP per capita, and hence is considered a "lagging region". It has both the highest percentage underutilization of labor and the highest growth rate in that percentage (indeed it is one of the few states where underutilization is in fact growing).
To put these figures in a different light we calculated what the wage would have had to be for the firm's current employment to be "statically optimal" (i.e., the wage equal to the firm's marginal revenue product of labor at its current employment level). Across The decrease in underutilization occurred in all size groups of firms, but it was most pronounced among firms with 50 to 100 workers (see Figure 2 ). The size cutoff at which firms must start abiding with restrictive employment regulations in most Indian states is 100 workers, so there is some indication that institutional changes have moderated the impact of those regulations during this period. We note that this occurred at the same time as the fraction of the manufacturing labor force employed by firms in the 50 to 100 worker group increased, so the fall in underutilization of labor in this group was not a result of this size group discarding a disproportionate number of workers. A related fact is that there was a distinct tendency over this period for manufacturing employment to shift from large firms (with more than 250 workers) to moderately sized firms (with 50 to 250 workers).
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5 Underutilization of Capital.
The differences between our estimates of the underutilization of capital and that of labor are striking. In particular there is overutilization of capital; i.e., the marginal revenue product of the capital employed at firms tends to be less than the cost of capital. As Table 7 This magnitude is much smaller than the corresponding magnitudes for the underutilization of labor. To see this in a more intuitive way we calculated what the cost of capital would have had to be for the firm's current capital to be "statically optimal" (i.e., the cost of capital equal to the firm's marginal revenue product of capital at its current capital level).
On average this "statically optimal" cost of capital was 58% of the current cost of capital in 6 Manufacturing Productivity.
While the focus of this chapter is not on the determinants of total factor productivity in the Indian manufacturing sector, we are interested in the relationship between our underutilization measures and productivity. Therefore we now discuss one finding on manufacturing productivity that is of interest to the subsequent results. It is presented in Table 8 and the accompanying Figure 5 and Figure 6 .
The table and figures show that interstate differences in average manufacturing productivity are not positively correlated with interstate differences in GDP per capita. The precise nature of the relationship between manufacturing productivity and GDP per capita differs depending on whether we consider a sales share weighted average of firm productivity, or an unweighted average of firm productivity. However it is clear that among all states except the very high GDP per capita states there is a negative relationship between manufacturing productivity and GDP per capita, though the relationship flattens out and may turn positive among the highest GDP per capita states. If states with higher GDP per capita are states in which overall productivity is higher, the higher productivity levels are coming from sectors other than manufacturing (e.g., services).
7 The Relationships Between Our Underutilization Measures, Our Productivity Measures, and Responses to the Investment Climate Survey.
In this section we discuss the findings from a reduced form analysis of the relationships between our firm-level underutilization measures and firm-level productivity, and the relationships between these three variables and the responses to questions in the investment climate survey. To facilitate the analysis we estimated a three-equation system using our measures of the underutilization of labor, the underutilization of capital, and productivity, as dependent variables. The "explanatory" variables are the same in all equations, and they are all based on information from the investment climate surveys. We put the word "explanatory" in quotation marks because we want to emphasize that we make no attempt to infer cause and effect from the estimates. We present them only as correlations that a causal model would have to rationalize. The estimates were obtained using seemingly unrelated regression techniques and are shown in Table 9 .
The variables from the investment climate survey included were the fraction of the firm's workforce that is unionized, whether the firm had a loan, production losses at the firm due to electricity outages, an indicator of corruption in inspections, the state-year level averages of these variables among the firms in our data set, and the average share of temporary labor in total employment in the state-year (as an indicator of flexibility of local labor markets).
Since for each included firm level variable we include also the state-year level averages of these variables, the effects of the firm level variables should be interpreted as within coefficients;
i.e., they provide the impact on the dependent variable of the difference between the right hand side variable and the average of that right hand side variable in the given state-year.
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We begin with the coefficients from the equation which has productivity as the left hand side variable, i.e. column 3 in Table 9 . All four of the firm level variables have significant coefficients in this equation. The estimated positive coefficient on the firm level unionization variable indicates that firms with a larger fraction of their labor force unionized are more productive than the average firm in their state. This finding could either be a result of it being easier to unionize in more productive firms, or of unionization increasing productivity. that the average level of unionization in the state-year is positively related to productivity would reinforce the possibility that unions find it easier to unionize where manufacturing productivity is higher. Note that the results in Table 9 also indicate that states with a higher degree of unionization tend to be states with relatively high underutilization of both capital and labor. Of course this need not be causal; it may be that there are omitted variables that cause underutilization and are correlated with state level unionization.
The relationships between productivity and the other firm specific variables are somewhat easier to interpret. Since our productivity estimates take direct account of the impact of capital on sales, the most obvious interpretation of the positive interaction between productivity and the firm level loan variable is that loan-granting institutions are able to select out the higher productivity firms in a region. In contrast, the corresponding state-year level variable indicates that the states in which a disproportionately high number of firms received loans were states with lower manufacturing productivity. About three quarters of loans granted in India are granted by governmental institutions, so the regional pattern of loans might reflect the goals of those institutions. The states in which a disproportionate share of firms has loans are states in which firms have significantly less underutilization of both labor and capital. We note that this finding is not a result of states with a higher fraction of firms having loans being states which are more developed, at least if we measure development by GDP per capita. We tried adding GDP per capita as a right hand side variable to all equations. None of the results presented in Table 9 changed notably, and the GDP per capita coefficients were all insignificant.
Provided not all production losses due to electricity outages were planned for we would expect the firms within a region that experience a higher fraction of their output lost due to electrical outages to have lower productivity, and this is what the results in Table 9 indeed show. Also provided that average production losses across a state influence a firm's perceptions about its own likely future production losses, we should expect a relationship between the state-year level measure of electricity outages and the employment of inputs that have a sunk component to their cost, and recall that we have found both labor and capital should be treated as inputs with sunk costs in India. As a result the strong positive relationship between the state-year level measure of production losses due to outages and both our underutilization measures should not be a surprise either. Interestingly, there is a positive relationship between productivity and the average production losses due to outages across state-years. This finding suggests that states where manufacturing is productive are the states which are pushing the boundaries of current electricity generating capacity.
The firm level corruption variable has a positive coefficient in the productivity equation, a finding that might reflect the possibility that it is the more productive firms that are most averse to corruption and therefore most likely to complain about it. The firm and state level coefficients on corruption in the utilization equations are opposite in sign. Firms which complain about corruption tend to employ less labor and capital, ceteris paribus, than other firms in the region. On the other hand the average number of complaints about corruption is higher in states with less underutilization of labor and capital.
None of the other firm level variables exhibit a significant relationship to either underutilization variable. Indeed the most striking information on the underutilization variables is contained in the residuals. Note first that the residual variance in both the underutilization regressions is about 98% of the total variance, and about 97% of that variance is within state variance. Given this, the residual covariances imply that the variable most closely related to underutilization of labor in our data is firm level productivity. That is the more productive firms in a region are holding back on hiring relatively more than less productive firms in the same region. Consequently if we were able to institute changes in labor regulations which resulted in all firms hiring labor up to the point where the marginal revenue product of labor equaled the wage we would not only increase employment, we would likely also redistribute output in a way that would increase overall productivity.
Interestingly the residuals also indicate that the more productive firms do not hold back on investment more than less productive firms; if anything they utilize relatively more capital.
This finding, taken together with the negative correlation between the underutilization of labor and capital residuals, suggests that one effect of the labor regulations in India might be to induce firms, especially more productive firms, to substitute capital for labor.
Conclusion
This chapter uses the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys to examine the labor and capital employment rates of Indian formal manufacturing firms and their relationship to productivity and investment climate variables. We are motivated by our desire to understand the factors underlying the relatively weak performance of the Indian formal manufacturing sector; relative to either the Indian services sector or to manufacturing sectors in similarly countries (e.g., China). We define measures of underutilization of labor for Indian firms as the ratio of (1) the labor employment that firms would optimally choose if there were no hiring and firing costs at current wage costs, and (2) firms' actual employment of labor.
Analogously, we construct measures of underutilization of capital for Indian firms.
We find that labor is underutilized in manufacturing firms operating in all states. That is, given the amount of capital used by firms, their productivity, and the cost of labor, firms are employing less labor than they would employ if they faced no hiring and firing costs. The extent of underutilization of labor differs substantially across Indian states. In particular, states with higher GDP per capita exhibit much less underutilization of labor.
In contrast, our results show overutilization of capital in Indian firms, though the extent of overutilization of capital is much smaller than the extent of underutilization of labor and does not vary a great deal across states. The overutilization of capital may be a response to the underutilization of labor as firms and states which underutilize labor disproportionately also overutilize capital disproportionately.
The most striking finding from our analysis of the relationships between the underutilization of labor, the underutilization of capital, and productivity, and between these three variables and investment climate variables, is that the extent of underutilization of labor by firms is strongly and positively related to firm productivity. Also, the more productive firms tend to overutilize capital more than the average, though not to the same extent that they underutilize labor.
Overall, our findings suggest that if labor market restrictions in states with "poorly functioning" labor markets were liberalized to the level of restrictions in states with better functioning labor markets, labor demand and wages would likely increase significantly in those states. Also such liberalization would likely increase productivity without significant increases in the demand for capital. This would occur both because our results suggest that an improvement in the functioning of labor markets would cause the more productive firms to increase their output disproportionately, and because firm productivity should increase as labor and capital employment move towards their efficient levels.
We also obtained a number of other more detailed findings. Firms which suffer more production losses due to electricity outages are less productive within their states and underutilize both labor and capital more than firms in states with less production losses due to electricity outages. Firms reporting more problems with corruption are shown to be the more productive firms in their state and they also exhibit relatively high underutilization of both factors of production. The relatively more productive firms within states are more likely to receive loans, suggesting that loan-granting institutions are able to select out the more productive firms. Finally, we find that states in which a disproportionate number of firms received loans are the states with less underutilization of both factors of production, particularly of capital. Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. ***. **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. The sample includes all firms with replacement capital and investment data in the initial survey (covering 2001). When labor is dynamic, it is treated as another state variable (like capital in the Olley and Pakes framework), otherwise it is assumed to be optimized out in each period. All specifications control for industry dummies and period dummies at all estimation stages. Notes: Seemingly unrelated regressions estimation used. Standard errors in parentheses. ***. **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. The regressions include year fixed effects. festival or year-end bonuses, etc.). The wages are expressed in terms of gross value i.e., before deduction for fines, damages, taxes, provident fund, employee's state insurance contribution. ii) Employers' contribution to provident fund and other funds: include old age benefits like provident fund, pension, gratuity, etc. and employers contribution towards other social security charges such as employees state insurance, compensation for work injuries and occupational diseases, provident fund-linked insurance, retrenchment and lay-off benefits.
iii) Workmen and staff welfare expenses: include group benefits like direct expenditure on maternity, day-care, canteen facilities, educational, cultural and recreational facilities, and grants to trade unions, co-operative stores meant for employees.
In Table 4 we show a measure of cost of capital from the Investment Climate Surveys calculated as the average in each state of the interest rate on loans taken up by firms since 1992. In order to compute underutilization of capital across firms, we use the average cost of capital across Indian states shown in Table 4 taken from the Annual Survey of Industries.
Our measure of the average cost of capital is obtained as the sum of the average interest rate obtained as the ratio of the items i) to ii) below and the average depreciation rate obtained as the ratio of the items iii) to iv) below.
i) Interest paid ii) Outstanding loans: represent all loans (short term or long term, interest bearing or not) outstanding according to the books of the factory as on the closing day of the accounting year.
iii) Depreciation: is consumption of fixed capital due to wear & tear and obsolescence during the accounting year and is taken as provided by the factory owner or is estimated on the basis of cost of installation and working life of the fixed assets. iv) Fixed capital: represents the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by the factory as on the closing day of the accounting year. Fixed assets are those that have a normal productive life of more than one year. Fixed capital includes land including leasehold land, buildings, plant & machinery, furniture and fixtures, transport equipment, water system and roadways and other fixed assets such as hospitals, schools, etc. used for the benefit of the factory personnel.
Appendix B. Underutilization of Labor and Capital in Sri Lanka
This appendix briefly examines the underutilization of labor and capital in Sri Lanka, another country characterized by restrictive labor market regulations, as discussed in World Bank (2007) . Note an important difference in the restrictiveness of labor market regulations in India versus Sri Lanka. In India, the restrictiveness lies in the difficulty of firing workers. However, Indian workers that are fired are entitled to low severance payments by international standards (see Ahsan and Pages, 2005) . In Sri Lanka, the restrictiveness lies in the very high severance payments that fired workers are entitled to.
Our approach is similar to that used for India: i.e., we construct underutilization of labor at current wage rates and underutilization of capital at current capital costs. However, we modify the approach given Sri Lanka's much smaller size and different regulatory environment. Sri Lanka is a unitary state and its provinces do not have legislative power on labor market regulations as the Indian states do. Thus, we consider Sri Lanka as a single labor market and a single capital market, not examining differences across provinces. Our analysis uses data from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey conducted in Sri Lanka in 2004. This dataset suffers from some caveats relative to India' s dataset. First, the Sri Lanka data is from a single survey round rather than two survey rounds. Thus, we are forced to use retrospective data for the accounting variables which as we mentioned in Section 2, can suffer from measurement problems. Second, the measure of capital used for firms in Sri Lanka is book value of capital, since replacement value information was not collected. Third, since we do not have data from a Sri Lanka census source such as the Indian ASI, we use measures of average compensation per worker from the Investment Climate Survey, which may under-or over-estimate the true labor costs faced by firms in the manufacturing sector. Fourth, some numerical problems constrain us to estimate the production function using the standard Olley and Pakes (1996) technique i.e., allowing labor to be adjustable in the short-run, in contrast to India where labor was assumed to be fixed in the short-run. However, our production function estimation allows for different coefficients for firms employing more than 50 workers and for firms employing less than 50 workers, as in the case of India. These caveats imply that the numbers below needs to be taken with a lot of caution, as they are only broadly indicative of the patterns of underutilization of factors. In particular, one should not compare the magnitudes of underutilization of factors across India and Sri Lanka since they are based on different data and on production function coefficients estimated using different techniques.
Our main finding is strong evidence of underutilization of labor across manufacturing firms in Sri Lanka. Overall we estimate underutilization of 1.1 times current manufacturing employment in 2003. Underutilization of labor is estimated to be positive for every size group of firms. We also calculated what the wage would have to be for firms' current employment to be "statically optimal" (i.e. the wage equal to a firm's marginal revenue product of labor at its current employment level). This wage averaged 2.1 times the current wage rates in 2003. As mentioned in Section 3, one has to be careful with the interpretation of these magnitudes. These figures do not imply that if there were no hiring and firing costs and constraints in Sri Lanka and firms were maximizing profits they would increase their employment by 110%. If firms started increasing their employment, wages would rise, output would rise and the prices of the firms' outputs would fall (beyond what we are allowing for here). These two factors would moderate the actual equilibrium employment implications of reducing hiring and firing costs and constraints.
For manufacturing firms in Sri Lanka we also find evidence of overutilization of capital. Specifically, the overutilization of capital is on average equal to about a third of the capital stock in 2003. As in the case of India, this magnitude is much smaller than the corresponding magnitudes for the underutilization of labor. We also calculated what the cost of capital would have to be for the firm's current capital to be "statically optimal" (i.e. the cost of capital equal to the firm' s marginal revenue product of capital at its current capital level). On average across manufacturing firms this "statically optimal" cost of capital was 58% of the current cost of capital in 2003. While this number is not
